[p1]
GENERAL: I have the honor to submit a detailed report of the operations
of this army from the time it left the operations of this army from the time it left the
vicinity of Fredericksburg, early in June, to its occupation of the line of the Rapidan, in
August.
[p2]
Upon the retreat of the Federal Army, commanded by Major-General Hooker, from
Chancellorsville, it reoccupied the ground north of the Rappahannock, opposite
Fredericksburg, where it could not be attacked excepting at a disadvantage. It was
determined to draw it from this position, and, if practicable, to transfer the scene of
hostilities beyond the Potomac. The execution of this purpose also embraced the
expulsion of the force under General Milroy, which had infested the lower Shenandoah
Valley during the preceding winter and spring. If unable to attain the valuable results
which might be expected to follow a decided advantage gained over the enemy in
Maryland or Pennsylvania, it was hoped that we should at least so far disturb his plan for
the summer campaign as to prevent its execution during the season of active operations.
[p3]
The commands of Longstreet and Ewell were put in motion, and encamped around
Culpeper Court-House June 7. As soon as their march was discovered by the enemy, he
threw a force across the Rappahannock, about 2 miles below Fredericksburg, apparently
for the purpose of observation. Hill's corps was left to watch these troops, with
instructions to follow the movements of the army as soon as they should retire.
[p4]
The cavalry, under General Stuart, which had been concentrated near Culpeper Court-
House, was attacked on June 9 by a large force of Federal cavalry, supported by infantry,
which crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly and Kelly's Fords. After a severe
engagement, which continued from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, the
enemy was compelled to recross the river with heavy loss, leaving about 500 prisoners, 3
pieces of artillery, and several colors in our hands.
[p5]
General Imboden and General Jenkins had been ordered to cooperate in the projected
expedition into the Valley, General Imboden by moving toward Romney with his
command, to prevent the troops guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from re-
enforcing those at Winchester, while General Jenkins advanced directly toward the latter
place with his cavalry brigade, supported by a battalion of infantry and a battery of the
Maryland Line.
[p6]
General Ewell left Culpeper Court-House on June 10. He crossed the branches of the
Shenandoah near Front Royal, and reached Cedarville on the 12th, where he was joined by
General Jenkins. Detaching General Rodes with his division, and the greater part of
Jenkins' brigade, to dislodge a force of the enemy stationed at Berryville, General Ewell,
with the rest of his command, moved upon Winchester. Johnson's division advancing by
the Front Royal road. Early's by the Valley turnpike, which it entered at Newtown, where
it was joined by the Maryland troops.
[p7]
The enemy was driven in on both roads, and our troops halted in line of battle near the
town on the evening of the 13th. The same day the force which had occupied Berryville
retreated to Winchester on the approach of General Rodes. The following morning,
General Ewell ordered General Early to carry an entrenched position northwest of
Winchester, near the Pughtown road, which the latter officer, upon examining the ground,
discovered would command the principal fortifications.
[p8]
To cover the movement of General Early, General Early, General Johnson took position
between the road to Millwood and that to Berryville, and advanced his skirmishers toward
the town. General Early, leaving a portion of his command to engage the enemy's
attention, with the remainder gained a favorable position without being perceived and,
about 5 p.m., twenty pieces of artillery, under Lieut. Col. H.P. Jones, opened suddenly
upon the entrenchment's. The enemy's guns were soon silenced. Hays' brigade then
advanced to the assault, and carried the works by storm, capturing six rifled pieces, two of
which were turned upon and dispersed a column which was forming to retake the position.
The enemy immediately abandoned the works on the left of those taken by Hays, and
retired into his main fortifications, which General Early prepared to assail in the morning.
The loss of the advanced works, however, rendered the others untenable, and the enemy
retreated in the night, abandoning his sick and wounded, together with his artillery,
wagons, and stores. Anticipating such a movement, as soon as he heard of Early's
success, General Ewell directed General Johnson to occupy, with part of his command, a
point on the Martinsburg road, about 2 1/2 miles from Winchester, where he could either
intercept the enemy's retreat, or aid in an attack should further resistance be offered in the
morning. General Johnson marched with Nicholls' and part of Stuart's brigades,
accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel [R.S.] Andrews with a detachment of his artillery, the
Stonewall Brigade being ordered to follow. Finding the road to the place indicated by
General Ewell difficult of passage in the darkness, General Johnson pursued that leading
by Jordan Springs to Stephenson's Depot, where he took a favorable position on the
Martinsburg road about 5 miles from Winchester. Just as his line was formed, the
retreating column, consisting of the main body of German Milroy's army, arrived, and
immediately attacked him. The enemy, though in superior force, consisting of both
infantry and cavalry, was gallantly repulsed, and, finding all efforts to cut his way
unavailing, he sent strong flanking parties simultaneously to the right and left, still keeping
up a heavy fire in front. The party on the right was driven back and pursued by the
Stonewall Brigade, which opportunely arrived. That on the left was broken and dispersed
by the Second and Tenth Louisiana Regiments, aided by the artillery, and in a short time
nearly the whole infantry force, amounting to more than 2,300 men, with eleven stand of
colors, surrendered, the cavalry alone escaping. General Milroy, with a small party of
fugitives, fled to Harper's Ferry. The number of prisoners taken in this action exceeded
the force engaged under General Johnson, who speaks in terms of well-deserved praise of
the conduct of the officers and men of his command.
[p9]
In the meantime, General Rodes marched from Berryville to Martinsburg, reaching the
latter place in the afternoon of the 14th. The enemy made a show of resistance, but soon
gave way, the cavalry and artillery retreating toward Williamsport, the infantry toward
Shepherdstown, under cover of night. The route taken by the latter was not known until it
was too late to follow; but the former were pursued so rapidly. Jenkins' troops leading,
that they were forced to abandon five of their six pieces of artillery. About 200 prisoners
were taken, but the enemy destroyed most of his stores.
[p10]
These operations resulted in the expulsion of the enemy from the Valley; the capture of
4,000 prisoners, with a corresponding number of small-arms: 28 pieces of superior
artillery, including those taken by Generals Rodes and Hays; about 300 wagons and as
many horses, together with a considerable quantity of ordinance, commissary, and
quartermaster's stores.
[p11]
Our entire loss was 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3 missing.
[p12]
On the night of Ewell's appearance at Winchester, the enemy in front of A.P. Hill at
Fredericksburg, recrossed the Rappahannock, and the whole army of General Hooker
withdrew from the north side of the river. In order to mislead him as to our intentions,
and at the same time protect Hill's corps in its march up the Rappahannock, Longstreet
left Culpeper Court-House on the 15th. and advancing along the eastern side of the Blue
Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. He had been joined while at Culpeper by
General Pickett, with three brigades of his division. General Stuart with three brigades of
cavalry, moved on Longstreet's right and took position in front of the Gaps. Hampton's
and [W.E.] Jones' brigades remained along the Rappahannock and Hazel Rivers in front of
Culpeper Court-House, with instructions to follow the main body as soon as Hill's corps
had passed that point.
[p13]
On the 17th, Fitz, Lee's brigade, under Colonel Munford, which was on the road to
Snicker's Gap, was attacked near Aldie by the Federal cavalry. The attack was repulsed
with loss and the brigade held its ground until ordered to fall back, its right being
threatened by another body, coming from Hopewell toward Middleburg. The latter force
was driven from Middleburg and pursued toward Hopewell by Robertson's brigade,
which arrived about dark. His retreat was intercepted by W. H. Lee's brigade, under
Colonel Chambliss, Jr., and the greater part of a regiment captured.
[p14]
During the three succeeding days there was much skirmishing, General Stuart taking a
position west of Middleburg, where he awaited the rest of his command.
[p15]
General Jones arrived on the 19th, and General Hampton in the afternoon of the following
day, having repulsed, on his march, a cavalry force sent to reconnoiter in the direction of
Warrenton.
[p16]
On the 21st, the enemy attacked with infantry and cavalry, and obliged General Stuart,
after a bravo resistance, to fall back to the gaps of the mountains. The enemy retired the
next day, having advanced only a short distance beyond Upperville.
[p17]
In these engagements, the cavalry sustained a loss of 510 killed, wounded, and missing.
Among them were several valuable officers, whose names are mentioned in General
Stuart's report. One piece of artillery was disabled and left on the field. The enemy's loss
was heavy. About 400 prisoners were taken and several stand of colors.
[p18]
The Federal Army was apparently guarding the approaches to Washington, and manifested
no disposition to assume the offensive.
[p19]
In the meantime, the progress of Ewell, who was already in Maryland, with Jenkins'
cavalry advanced into Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg, rendered it necessary that the
rest of the army should be within supporting distance, and Hill having reached the Valley,
Longstreet was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, and the two corps
encamped near Berryville.
[p20]
General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with part of his command as long
as the enemy remained south of the Potomac, and with the remainder to cross into
Maryland, and place himself on the right of General Ewell. Upon the suggestion of the
former officer that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by
getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion whether to
enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in
placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he should perceive the enemy
moving northward.
[p21]
On the 22nd, General Ewell marched into Pennsylvania with Rodes' and Johnson's
divisions, preceded by Jenkins' cavalry, taking the road from Hagerstown, through
Chambersburg, to Carlisle, where he arrived on the 27th. Early's division, which had
occupied Boonsborough, moved by a parallel road to Greenwood, and, in pursuance of
instructions previously given to General Ewell, marched toward York.
[p22]
On the 24th, Lonstreet and Hill were put in motion to follow Ewell, and on the 27th,
encamped near Chambersburg.
[p23]
General Imboden, under the orders before referred to, had been operating on Ewell's left
while the latter was advancing into Maryland. He drove off the troops guarding the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and destroyed all the important bridges on that route from
Martinsburg to Cumberland, besides inflicting serious damage on the Chesapeake and
Ohio Canal. He was at Hancock when Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg, and
was directed to proceed to the latter place by way of McConnellsburg, collecting supplies
for the army on his route.
[p24]
The cavalry force at this time with the army, consisting of Jenkins' brigade and [E.V.]
White's battalion, was not greater than was required to accompany the advance of General
Ewell and General Early, with whom it performed valuable service, as appears from their
reports. It was expected that as soon as the Federal Army should cross the Potomac,
General Stuart would give notice of its movements, and nothing having been heard from
him since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not yet left
Virginia. Orders were, therefore, issued to move upon Harrisburg. The expedition of
General Early to York was designed in part to prepare for this undertaking by breaking the
railroad between Baltimore and Harrisburg, and seizing the bridge over the Susquehanna
at Wrightsville. General Early succeeded in the first object, destroying a number of
bridges above and below York but on the approach of the troops sent by him to
Wrightsville, a body of militia stationed at that place fled across the river and burned the
bridge in their retreat. General Early then marched to rejoin his corps.
[p25]
The advance against Harrisburg was arrested b intelligence received from a scout on the
night of the 28th, to the effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac,
and was approaching the South Mountain. In the absence of the cavalry, it was impossible
to ascertain his intentions; but to deter him from advancing farther west, and intercepting
our communication with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army cast of the
mountains.
[p26]
Hill's corps was accordingly ordered to move toward Cashtown on the 29th, and
Longstreet to follow the next day, leaving Pickett's division at Chambersburg to guard the
rear until relieved by Imboden. General Ewell was recalled from Carlisle, and directed to
join the army at Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might require. The advance of
the enemy to the latter place was unknown, and the weather being inclement, the march
was conducted with a view to the comfort of the troops. Heth's division reached
Cashtown on the 29th, and the following morning Pettigrew's brigade, sent by General
Heth to procure supplies at Gettysburg, found it occupied by the enemy. Being ignorant
of the extent of his force, General Pettigrew was unwilling to hazard an attack with his
single brigade, and returned to Cashtown.
[p27]
General Hill arrived with Ponder's division in the evening, and the following morning (July
1) advanced with these two divisions, accompanied by Pengram's and McIntosh's
battalions of artillery, to strength of the enemy, whose force was supposed to consist
chiefly of cavalry. The leading division, under General Heth, found the enemy's vedettes
about 3 miles west of Gettysburg, and continued to advance until within a mile of the
town, when two brigades were sent forward to reconnoiter. They drove in the advance of
the enemy very gallantly, but subsequently encountered largely superior numbers, and
were compelled to retire with loss, Brigadier-General Archer, commanding one of the
brigades, being taken prisoner. General Heth then prepared for action, and as soon as
Ponder arrived to support him, was ordered by General Hill to advance. The artillery was
placed in position, and the engagement opened with vigor. General Heth pressed the
enemy steadily back, breaking his first and second lines, and attacking his third with great
resolution. About 2:30 p.m. the advance of Ewell's corps, consisting of Rodes' division,
with Carter's battalion of artillery, arrived by the Middletown road, and, forming on
Heth's left, nearly at right angles with his line, became warmly engaged with fresh
numbers of the enemy. Seth's troops, having suffered heavily in their protracted contest
with a superior force, were relieved by Ponder's and Early, coming up by the Heidlersburg
road soon afterward, took position on the left of Rodes, when a general advance was
made.
[p28]
The enemy gave way on all sides, and was driven through Gettysburg with great loss.
Major-General Reynolds, who was in command was killed. More than 5,000 prisoners,
exclusive of a large number of wounded, three pieces of artillery, and several colors were
captured. Among the prisoners were two brigadier-generals, one of whom was badly
wounded. Our own loss was heavy, including a number of officers, among whom were
Major-General Heth, slightly and Brigadier-General Scales, of Pender's division, severely,
wounded. The enemy retired to a range of hills south of Gettysburg, where he displayed a
strong force of infantry and artillery.
[p29]
It was ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the
army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of that army, under
General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg. Without information as to its proximity, the
strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of
exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody
struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. General Ewell was, therefore,
instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a
general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were
ordered to hasten forward. He decided to await Johnson's division, which had marched
from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains to guard the trains of his corps, and
consequently did not reach Gettysburg until a late hour.
[p30]
In the meantime the enemy occupied the point which General Ewell designed to seize, but
in what force could not be ascertained, owing to the darkness. An intercepted dispatch
showed that another corps had halted that afternoon 4 miles form Gettysburg. Under
these circumstances, it was decided not to attack until the arrival of Longstreet, two of
whose divisions (those of Hood and McLaws) encamped about 4 miles in the rear during
the night. Anderson's division of Hill's corps came up after the engagement.
[p31]
It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked,
but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal Army, to withdraw through the
mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same
time we were unable to await an attack, as the country was unfavorable for collecting
supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding
the mountain passes with local and other troops. A battle had, therefore, become in a
measure unavoidable, and the success already gained gave hope of a favorable issue.
[p32]
The enemy occupied a strong position, with his right upon two commanding elevations
adjacent to each other, one southeast and the other, known as Cemetery Hill, immediately
south of the town, which lay at its base. His line extended thence upon the high g round
along the Emmitsburg road with a steep ridge in rear, which was also occupied. This
ridge was difficult of ascent, particularly the two hills above mentioned as forming its
northern extremity, and a third at the other end, on which the enemy's left rested.
Numerous stone and rail fences along the slope served to afford protection to his troops
and impede our advance. In his front, the ground was undulating and generally open for
about three-quarters of a mile.
[p33]
General Ewell's corps constituted our left. Johnson's division being opposite the height
adjoining Cemetery Hill, Early's in the center, in front of the north face of the latter, and
Rodes upon his right. Hill's corps faced the west side of Cemetery Hill, and extended
nearly parallel to the Emmitsburg road, making an angle with Ewell's Pender's division
formed his left, Ander's his right. Heth's, under Brigadier-General Pettigrew, being in
reserve. His artillery, under Colonel [R. L.] Walker, was posted in eligible positions along
his line.
[p34]
It was determined to make the principal attack on the enemy's left, and endeavor to gain a
position from which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bear with effect.
Longstreet was directed to place the divisions of McLaws and Hood on the right of Hill,
partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was to drive in.
[p35]
General Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy's center, to prevent re-enforcements being
drawn to either wing, and co-operate with his right division in Longstreet's attack.
[p36]
General Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy's
right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer.
[p37]
About 4 p.m. Longstreet's batteries opened, and soon afterward Hood's division, on the
extreme right, moved to the attack. McLaws followed somewhat later, four of
Anderson's brigades, those of Wilcox, Perry, [A.R.] Wright, and Posey supporting him on
the left in the order named. The enemy was soon driven from his position on the
Emmitsburg road to the cover of a ravine and a line of stone fences at the foot of the ridge
in his rear. he was dislodged from those after a severe struggle, and retired up the ridge,
leaving a number of his batteries in our possession. Wilcox's and Wright's brigades
advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines of the enemy's infantry, and
compelling him to abandon much of his artillery. Wilcox reached the foot and Wright
gained the crest of the ridge itself, driving the enemy down the opposite side: but having
become separated from McLaws and gone beyond the other two brigades of the division,
they were attacked in front and on both flanks, and compelled to retire being unable to
bring off any of the captured artillery. McLaws' left also fell back and, it being now nearly
dark, General Longstreet determined to await the arrival of General Pickett. He disposed
his command to hold the ground gained on the right, withdrawing his left to the first
position from which the enemy had been driven.
[p38]
Four pieces of artillery, several hundred prisoners, and two regimental flags were taken.
As soon as the engagement began on our right, General Johnson opened with his artillery,
and about two hours later advanced up the hill next to Cemetery Hill with three brigades,
the fourth being detained by a demonstration on his left. Soon afterward, General Early
attacked Cemetery Hill with two brigades, supported by a third, the fourth having been
previously detached. The enemy had greatly increased by earthworks the strength of the
positions assailed by Johnson and Early.
[p39]
The troops of the former moved steadily up the steep and rugged ascent, under a heavy
fire, driving the enemy into his entrenchment's, part of which was carried by Stuart's
brigade, and a number of prisoners taken. The contest was continued to a late hour, but
without further advantage. On Cemetery Hill, the attack by Early's leading brigades --
those of Hays and Hoke under Colonel [I.E.] Avery -- was made with vigor. Two lines of
the enemy's infantry were dislodged from the cover of some stone and board fences on the
side of the ascent, and driven back into the works on the crest, into which our troops
forced their way, and seized several pieces of artillery.
[p40]
A heavy force advanced against their right which was without support, and they were
compelled to retire bringing with them about 100 prisoners and four stand of colors.
General Ewell had directed General Rodes to attack in concert with Early, covering his
right and had requested Brigadier-General Lane, then commanding Pender's division, to
co-operate on the right of Rodes. When the time to attack arrived, General Rodes, not
having his troops in position, was unprepared to co-operate with General Early, and
before he could get in readiness the latter had been obliged to retire for want of the
expected support on his right. General Lane was prepared to give the assistance required
of him, and so informed General Rodes, but the latter deemed it useless to advance afte
the failure of Early's attack.
[p41]
In this engagement our loss in men and officers was large. Major-Generals Hood, and
Pender, Brigadier-Generals [J.M.] Jones, Semmes, G.T. Anderson, and Barksdale, and
Colonel Avery, commanding Hoke's brigade, were wounded, the last two mortally.
Generals Pender and Semmes died after their removal to Virginia.
[p42]
The result of this day's operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action,
and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the
artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was
accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged.
Longstreet, re-enforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field
during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell
was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time. The latter, during the night, re-
enforced General Johnson with two brigades from Rodes' and one from Early 's division.
[p43]
General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before
notice could be sent to General Ewell, General Johnson had already become engaged, and
it was too late to recall him. The enemy attempted to recover the works taken the
preceding evening, but was repulsed, and General Johnson attacked in turn.
[p44]
After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of
his entrenchment's, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly fortified
crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was
enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of General Johnson and
finally to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original
position about 1 p.m.
[p45]
General Longstret was delayed by a force occupying the high rocky hills on the enemy's
extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His
operations had been embarrassed the day previously by the same cause, and he now
deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws.
He was, therefore, re-enforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's, to the
command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned. General Hill was directed to
hold his line with the rest of his command, afford General Longstreet further assistance, if
required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained.
[p46]
A careful examination was made of the ground secured by Longstreet, and his batteries
placed in positions, which it was believed, would enable them to silence those of the
enemy. Hill's artillery and part of Ewell's was ordered to open simultaneously, and the
assaulting column to advance under cover of the combined fire of the three. The batteries
were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and
support their attacks closely.
[p47]
About 1 p.m., at a given signal, a heavy cannonade was opened, and continued for about
two hours with marked effect upon the enemy. His batteries replied vigorously at first,
but toward the close their fire slackened perceptibly, and General Longstreet ordered
forward the column of attack, consisting of Pickett's and Heth's divisions, in two lines,
Pickett on the right. Wilcox's brigade, marched in rear of Pickett's right, to guard that
flank, and Heth's was supported by Lane's and Scales' brigades' under General Trimble.
[p48]
The troops moved steadily on, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, the main attack
being directed against the enemy's left conter.
[p49]
His batteries reopened as soon as they appeared. Our own having nearly exhausted their
ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were
unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking party. Owing to this fact,
which was unknown to me when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled to throw a
strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of
artillery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill, on the left. It finally gave way,
and the right, after penetrating the enemy's lines, entering his advanced works, and
capturing some of his artillery was attacked simultaneously in front and on both flanks,
and driven back with heavy loss.
[p50]
The troops were rallied and reformed, but the enemy did not pursue.
[p51]
A large number of brave officers and men fell or were captured on this occasion. Of
Pickett's three brigade commanders, Generals Armistead and [R.B.] Garnett were killed,
and General Kemper dangerously wounded.
[p52]
Major-General Trimble and Brigadier-General Pettigrew were also wounded, the former
severely.
[p53]
The movements of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much
embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry. As soon as it was known that the enemy had
crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of [B.H.] Robertson and [William
E.] Jones, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, to rejoin the army
without delay, and it was expected that General Stuart, with the remainder of his
command, would soon arrive. In the exercise of the discretion given him when Longstreet
and Hill marched into Maryland. General Stuart determined to pass around the rear of the
Federal Army with three brigades and cross the Potomac between it and Washington,
believing that he would be able, by that route to place himself on our right flank in time to
keep us property advised of the enemy's movements. He marched from Salem on the
night of June 24, intending to pass west of Centreville, but found the enemy's forces so
distributed as to render that route impracticable. Adhering to his original plan, he was
forced to make a wide detour through Buckland and Brentsville, and crossed the
Occoquan at Wolf Run Shoals on the morning of the 27th. Continuing his march through
Fairfax Court-House and Dranesville, he arrived at the Potomac, below the mouth of
Seneca Creek, in the evening.
[p54]
He found the river much swollen by the recent rains, but after great exertion, gained the
Maryland shore before midnight with his whole command.
[p55]
He now ascertained that the Federal Army, which he had discovered to be drawing/toward
the Potomac, had crossed the day before, and was moving toward Frederick, thus
interposing itself between him and our forces.
[p56]
He accordingly marched northward, through Rockville and Westminster, to Hanover, Pa.,
where he arrived on the 30th; but the enemy advanced with equal rapidity on his left, and
continued to obstruct communication with our main body.
[p57]
Supposing, from such information as he could obtain, that part of the army was at Carlisle,
he left Hanover that night, and proceeded thither by way of Dover.
[p58]
He reached Carlisle on July 1, where he received orders to proceed to Gettysburg.
[p59]
He arrived in the afternoon of the following day, and took position on General Ewell's
left. His leading brigade, under General Hampton, encountered and repulsed a body of the
enemy's cavalry at Hunterstown, endeavoring to reach our rear.
[p60]
General Stuart had several skirmishes during his march, and at Hanover quite a severe
engagement took place with a strong force of cavalry, which was finally compelled to
withdraw from the town.
[p61]
The prisoners taken by the cavalry and paroled at various places amounted to about 800,
and at Rockville a large train of wagons coming from Washington was intercepted and
captured. Many of them were destroyed, but 125, with all the animals of the train, were
secured.
[p62]
The ranks of the cavalry were much reduced by its long and arduous march, repeated
conflicts, and insufficient supplies of food and forage, but the day after its arrival at
Gettysburg it engaged the enemy's cavalry with unabated spirit, and effectually protected
our left.
[p63]
In this action, Brigadier-General Hampton was seriously wounded, while acting with his
accustomed gallantry.
[p64]
Robertson's and Jones' brigades arrived on July 3, and were stationed upon our right
flank. The severe loss sustained by the army and the reduction of its ammunition,
rendered another attempt to dislodge the enemy inadvisable, and it was, therefore,
determined to withdraw.
[p65]
The trains, with such of the wounded as could bear removal, were ordered to Williamsport
on July 4, part moving through Cashtown and Greencastle, escorted by General Imboden,
and the remainder by the Fairfield road.
[p66]
The army retained its position until dark, when it was put in motion for the Potomac by
the last-named route.
[p67]
A heavy rain continued throughout the night, and so much impeded its progress that
Ewell's corps, which brought up the rear, did not leave Gettysburg until late in the
forenoon of the following day. The enemy offered no serious interruption, and after an
arduous march, we arrived at Hagerstown in the afternoon of the 6th and morning of July
7.
[p68]
The great length of our trains made it difficult to guard them effectually in passing through
the mountains, and a number of wagons and ambulances were captured. They succeeded
in reaching Williamsport on the 6th, but were unable to cross the Potomac on account of
the high stage of water. Here they were attacked by a strong force of cavalry and artillery,
which was gallantly repulsed by General Imboden, whose command had been strengthened
by several batteries and by two regiments of infantry, which had been detached at
Winchester to guard prisoners, and were returning to the army.
[p69]
While the enemy was being held in check, General Stuart arrived with the cavalry, which
had performed valuable service in guarding the flanks of the army during the retrograde
movement, and, after a short engagement, drove him from the field. The rains that had
prevailed almost without intermission since our entrance into Maryland, and greatly
interfered with our movements, had made the Potomac unaffordable, and the pontoon
bridge left at Falling Waters had been partially destroyed by the enemy. The wounded and
prisoners were sent over the river as rapidly as possible in a few ferry-boats, while the
trains awaited the subsiding of the waters and the construction of a new pontoon bridge.
[p70]
On July 8, the enemy's cavalry advanced toward Hagerstown, but was repulsed by
General Stuart, and pursued as far as Boonsborough.
[p71]
With this exception, nothing but occasional skirmishing occurred until the 12th, when the
main body of the enemy arrived. The army then took a position previously selected,
covering the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, where it remained for two
days, with the enemy immediately in front, manifesting no disposition to attack, but
throwing up entrenchment's along his whole line.
[p72]
By the 13th, the river at Williamsport, though still deep, was fordable, and a good bridge
was completed at Falling Waters, new boats having been constructed and some of the old
recovered. As further delay would enable the enemy to obtain re-enforcements, and as it
was found difficult to procure a sufficient supply of flour for the troops, the working of
the mills begin interrupted by high water, it was determined to await an attack no longer.
[p73]
Orders were accordingly given to cross the Potomac that night, Ewell's corps by the ford
at Williamsport, and those of Longstreet and Hill on the bridge.
[p74]
The cavalry was directed to relieve the infantry skirmishers, and being up the rear.
[p75]
The movement was much retarded by a severe rain storm and the darkness of the night.
Ewell's corps, having the advantage of a turnpike road, marched with less difficulty, and
crossed the river by 8 o'clock the following morning. The condition of the road to the
bridge and the time consumed in the passage of the artillery, ammunition wagons, and
ambulances, which could not ford the river, so much delayed the progress of Longstreet
and Hill, that it was daylight before their troops began to cross. Heth's division was
halted about a mile and a half from the bridge, to protect the passage of the column. No
interruption was offered by the enemy until about 11 a.m., when his cavalry, supported by
artillery, appeared in front of General Heth.
[p76]
A small number in advance of the main body was mistaken for our own cavalry retiring, no
notice having been given of the withdrawal of the latter, and was suffered to approach our
lines. They were immediately destroyed or captured, with the exception of two or three,
but Brigadier-General Pettigrew, an officer of great merit and promise, was mortally
wounded in the encounter. He survived his removal to Virginia only a few days.
[p77]
The bridge being clear, General Heth began to withdraw. The enemy advanced, but his
efforts to break our lines were repulsed, and the passage of the river was completed by 1
p.m. Owing to the extent of General Heth's line, some of his men most remote from the
bridge were cut off before they could reach it, but the greater part of those taken by the
enemy during the movement (supposed to amount in all to about 500) consisted of men
from various commands who lingered behind, overcome by previous labors and hardships
and the fatigue of a most trying night march. There was no loss of material excepting a
few broken wagons and two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to draw
through the deep mud. Other horses were sent back for them, but the rear of the column
had passed before their arrival.
[p78]
The army proceeded to the vicinity of Bunker Hill and Darkesville where it halted to
afford the troops repose.
[p79]
The enemy made no effort to follow excepting with his cavalry, which crossed the
Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and advanced toward Martinsburg on July 16.
[p80]
They were attacked by General Fitz. Lee, with his own and Chambliss' brigades, and
driven back with loss.
[p81]
When the army returned to Virginia, it was intended to move into Loudoun, but the
Shenandoah was found to be impassable. While waiting for it to subside, the enemy
crossed the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, and seized the passes we designed to use. As
he continued to advance along the eastern slope, apparently with the purpose of cutting us
off from the railroad to Richmond, General Longstreet was ordered, on July 19, to
proceed to Culpeper Court-House by way of Front Royal. He succeeded in passing part
of his command over the Shenandoah in time to prevent the occupation of Manassas and
Chester Gaps by the enemy, whose cavalry had already made its appearance.
[p82]
As soon as a pontoon bridge could be laid down, the rest of his corps crossed the river,
and marched through Chester Gap to Culpeper Court-House, where it arrived on the 24th.
He was followed without serious opposition by General A.P. Hill.
[p83]
General Ewell having been detained in the Valley by an effort to capture a force of the
enemy guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad west of Martinsburg. Wright's brigade
was left to hold Manassas Gap until his arrival. He reached Front Royal on the 23d, with
Johnson's and Rodes' divisions, Early's being near Winchester, and found General Wright
skirmishing with the enemy's infantry, which had already appeared in Manassas Gap.
General Ewell supported Wright with Rodes' division and some artillery, and the enemy
was held in check.
[p84]
Finding that the Federal force greatly exceeded his own, General Ewell marched through
Thornton's Gap, and ordered Early to move up the Valley by Strasburg and New Market.
He encamped near Madison Court-House on July 29.
[p85]
The enemy massed his army in the vicinity of Warrenton, and, on the night of July 31, his
cavalry, with a large supporting force of infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at
Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford.
[p86]
The next day they advanced toward Brandy Station, their progress being gallantly resisted
by General Stuart with Hampton's brigade, commanded by Colonel [L.S.] Baker, who fell
back gradually to our lines, about 2 miles south of Brandy. Our infantry skirmishers
advanced, and drove the enemy beyond Brandy Station. It was now determined to place
the army in a position to enable it more readily to oppose the enemy should he attempt to
move southward, that near Culpepper Court-House being one that he could easily avoid.
Longstreet and Hill were put in motion August 3, leaving the cavalry at Culpeper.
[p87]
Ewell had been previously ordered from Madison, and, by the 4th, the army occupied the
line of the Rapidan.
[p88]
The highest praise is due to both officers and men for their conduct during the campaign.
The privations and hardships of the march and camp were cheerfully encountered, and
borne with a fortitude unsurpassed by our ancestors in their struggle for independence,
while their courage in battle entitles them to rank with the soldiers of any army and of any
time. Their forbearance and discipline under strong provocation to retaliate for the cruelty
of the enemy to our own citizens, is not their least claim to the respect and admiration of
their countrymen and of the world.
[p89]
I forward returns of our loss in killed, wounded, and missing. Many of the latter were
killed or wounded in the several assaults at Gettysburg, and necessarily left in the hands of
the enemy. I cannot speak of these brave men as their merits and exploits deserve. Some
of them are appropriately mentioned in the accompanying reports, and the memory of all
will be gratefully and affectionately cherished by the people in whose defense they fell.
[p90]
The loss of Major-General Pender is severely felt by the army and the country. He served
with this army from the beginning of the war, and took a distinguished part in its
engagements. Wounded on several occasions, he never left his command in action until he
received the injury that resulted in his death. His promise and usefulness as an officer
were only equaled by the purity and excellence of his private life.
[p91]
Brigadier-Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnett, and Semmes died as they had lived,
discharging the highest duty of patriots with devotion that never faltered and courage that
shrank from no danger.
[p92]
I earnestly commend to the attention of the Government those gallant officers and men
whose conduct merited the special commendation of their superiors, but whose names I
am unable to mention in this report.
[p93]
The officers of the general staff of the army were unremittingly engaged in the duties of
their respective departments. Much depended on their management and exertion. The
labors of the quartermaster's, commissary, and medical departments were more than
usually severe. The inspectors-general were also laboriously occupied in their attention to
the troops both on the march and in camp, and the officers of engineers showed skill and
judgment in expediting the passage of rivers and streams, the swollen condition of which,
by almost continuous rains, called for extraordinary exertion.
[p94]
The chief of ordinance and his assistants are entitled to praise for the care and
watchfulness given to the ordinance trains and ammunition of the army, which, in a long
march and in many conflicts, were always at hand and accessible to the troops.
[p95]
My thanks are due to my personal staff for their constant aid afforded me at all times, on
the march and in the field, and their willing discharge of every duty.
[p96]
There were captured at Gettysburg nearly 7,000 prisoners of whom about 1,500 were
paroled, and the remainder brought to Virginia. Seven pieces of artillery were also
secured.
[p97]
I forward herewith the reports of the corps, division, and other commanders mentioned in
the accompanying schedule, together with maps of the scene of operations, and one
showing the routes pursued by the army.
Respectfully submitted.
R.E. LEE
General
General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General